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Climate Change and Weather-related Disasters:   




The adverse impacts associated with extreme weather events have 
increased over the last few decades, and this appears to be due to several 
factors, including climate change and global warming, the growth of urban 
development and population density in exposed areas, and a higher 
concentration of assets and values at risk.  The growing impact of the direct 
and indirect costs associated with weather-related disasters worldwide calls 
for an evaluation of possible strategies to reduce their large-scale damaging 
effects.  The design and implementation of effective financial management 
strategies to deal with the increasing costs arising out of extreme weather 
events require a proactive role of governments in direct and continuous 
collaboration with the private sector.  This paper discusses possible roles of 
insurance, reinsurance and financial sector participants from a public policy 
perspective, with a view to understanding how they can contribute to the 
achievement of designated policy goals. 
1. Introduction
As evidenced by recent dramatic events, the frequency and severity of 
extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and associated 
landslides, storms, tropical cyclones, ocean and coastal surges, heat waves, 
forest fires and cold snaps, have increased over the last few decades. 
Escalating impacts associated with these events appear to be due to several 
factors, including climate change and global warming, the growth of urban 
development and population density in exposed areas, and a higher 
concentration of assets and values at risk. 
While the ongoing effects of global warming on climate extremes is 
debated in the scientific community,1 a few things seem relatively clear: 
* Professor of Law, Bocconi University, School of Law, Italy.
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], A Report of Working
Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 
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rising sea levels increase the risk of storm surges thereby increasing the 
exposure and vulnerability of assets located in coastal areas; increasing land 
and air temperatures exacerbate the risk of wild fires and drought and pose 
serious health risks for the population; and changing patterns of 
precipitation aggravate the risk of winter storms and floods.2 
The growing impact of the direct and indirect costs associated with 
weather-related disasters worldwide3 calls for an evaluation of possible 
strategies to reduce their large-scale damaging effects.4 In this respect, the 
design and implementation of effective financial management strategies to 
deal with the increasing costs arising out of extreme weather events require 
governments to take a proactive role in direct and continuous collaboration 
with the private financial sector. 
This paper discusses possible roles of insurance, reinsurance and 
financial sector participants from a public policy perspective, with a view to 
understanding how they can contribute to the achievement of designated 
policy goals. 
2. Financial Management of Weather-Related Disasters:
A Public Policy Perspective
From a public policy viewpoint, the rising costs associated with 
extreme weather events pose serious challenges to governments worldwide. 
The main issues in this field have been recently identified and addressed by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).5 The 
Cambridge University Press 2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/; see also HARTMUT
GRABL ET AL., WEATHER CATASTROPHES AND CLIMATE CHANGE – IS THERE STILL HOPE FOR US?
(Munich Re’s Geo Risks Research 2005). 
2. Lloyd’s, 360 Risk Project, in CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT (Lloyd’s 2006), available at
http://www.lloyds.com/NewsCentre/360_risk_project/ The_debate_onclimatechange/. See 
also U.N. Envtl. Programme Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], Adaptation and Vulnerability to Climate 
Change: The Role of the Finance Sector (Nov. 2006), available at http://www. unepfi.org/. 
3. The increases in disaster losses due to natural catastrophes primarily result
from weather related events, in particular windstorms events and floods.  See, e.g., 
MUNICH RE, TOPICS GEO NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2007 (Munich Re 2008); SWISS RE, SIGMA
NO. 1/2008, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2007 (Swiss 
Reinsurance Co. 2008). See also MUNICH RE, TOPICS GEO NATURAL CATASTROPHES 2006 
(Munich Re 2007); SWISS RE, SIGMA NO. 2/2007, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE
DISASTERS IN 2006 (Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2007). 
4. See CLIMATE EXTREMES AND SOCIETY (Henry F. Diaz & Richard J. Murnane eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
5. Established in 1961, the OECD is an intergovernmental organization based
in Paris. The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to 
democracy and the market economy from around the world to: support sustainable 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009 
153 
OECD, in the context of a broader project focusing on the financial 
management of large-scale catastrophes (natural and man-made), 
established the OECD International Network to promote the exchange of 
information and experiences among policymakers, industry, and academia 
in OECD and non-member countries, and provide state-of-the-art expertise 
and policy advice.6 
Key public policy questions include: Are governments in developed 
and emerging countries adopting efficient strategies to manage the 
increasing financial burden of catastrophes? What are the roles and 
responsibilities of key stakeholders in the public and private sectors in the 
management of disaster risks and costs? How best to prepare for the 
unprecedented challenges posed by large-scale risks? 
Under the auspices of this project, the OECD just completed a survey 
and comparative review of different policy strategies and approaches with 
respect to the prevention, mitigation, and financial compensation of large-
scale catastrophes in selected OECD and non-member countries. The 
comparative review focuses, in particular, on the approaches adopted by 
governments regarding financial coverage against disaster risks, and the 
respective roles of the public and private sectors in providing compensation 
and incentives to reduce the risk of catastrophic losses.7 
The public sector is directly concerned with this issue and these 
questions for several reasons.  First, the increasing financial impact of 
weather-related disasters on individuals and businesses may be significant, 
which could lead to large welfare losses and have broad macroeconomic 
consequences. Second, public assets, including buildings and 
infrastructures, are exposed to extreme climate risk and whose destruction 
or impairment may have economic impacts.  Finally, in the aftermath of a 
catastrophe, the public authority will likely be under strong political 
pressure – or sometimes even under a legal duty – to provide compensation 
to victims. In light of the above, the availability of financial compensation 
economic growth; boost employment; raise living standards; maintain financial 
stability; assist other countries’ economic development; and contribute to growth in 
world trade. The OECD also shares expertise and exchanges views with more than 
100 other countries and economies, from Brazil, China, and Russia to the least 
developed countries in Africa, http://www.oecd.org. 
6. See http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/catrisks; ALBERTO MONTI, Financial Management
of Large Scale Catastrophes, CATASTROPHE RISK MANAGEMENT, 20 (September 2006); 
ALBERTO MONTI, Managing and Financing Large Scale Risks in OECD Countries. Challenges and 
Institutional Solutions, INS. REG. & DEV. AUTHORITY J., vol. V, n.5, 13 (April 2007). 
7. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large-Scale
Disasters, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES’, POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. N.12, 
11-142 (OECD Publishing) (2008).
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and risk transfer tools ex ante can enhance economic efficiency and 
performance. 
Many OECD countries have developed policies focused on the 
financial management of large-scale disaster risks with common goals of 
reducing the negative impact of disaster losses on the population and 
economy and facilitating and improving relief, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction efforts.  In several OECD countries, moreover, policy 
objectives in this area expressly include the enhancement of disaster risk 
prevention, reduction, mitigation, adaptation and response strategies, and 
the reduction of government exposure to catastrophe risk. The long term 
goals of these policies are to minimize the total cost of disasters (i.e., the 
sum of disaster losses, the cost of preventive/mitigation measures and 
transaction costs) and build disaster-resilient societies. To implement such 
policies and to achieve the stated objectives, governments have employed a 
wide array of different policy tools and pursued different strategies. 
In the aftermath of a catastrophe, governments in all OECD countries 
regularly provide some degree of post-disaster assistance and aid to the 
population. Emergency rescue and relief efforts are generally acknowledged 
to be part of the responsibilities of a State to its citizens. Such efforts are 
aimed at saving lives and providing temporary assistance to the population 
hit by a disaster event, and the costs of such measures are usually financed 
through the payment of taxes. In certain countries, emergency relief costs 
and sometimes also government exposures to public assets and critical 
infrastructure disaster losses are funded by dedicated catastrophe reserve 
funds, occasionally supplemented by market-based risk transfer tools.8 
In terms of reconstruction costs and compensation of property 
damages and economic losses suffered by those affected by a disaster, the 
situation differs across jurisdictions. In some states the government directly 
provides, to a greater or lesser extent, compensation to property owners ex 
post by means of either permanent structural arrangements (such as 
compensation funds) or ad hoc disbursement of public funds on a 
discretionary basis.9 
In a number of countries, pursuant to the principle of solidarity – often 
recognized at the constitutional level – the mutualisation of losses arising 
out of a disaster event is perceived as a fundamental right of the citizens, 
and the role of the government in the compensation phase is, therefore, 
considered essential. This is the case, for instance, in Belgium, France, Italy 
and Spain. 
8. This is the case, for instance, of Mexico.8. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to
the Financial Management of Large-Scale Disasters, FIN. MGMT. OF LARGE-SCALE CATASTROPHES,
POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. N.12, 11-143 (OECD Publishing) (2008).   
9. See Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes. A Comparative Legal Approach,
TORT AND INS. LAW VOL. 14 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., Springer 2006). 
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In other countries, the protection of private property against disaster 
risks is to a large extent left to the initiative of the owners (i.e., businesses 
and individuals), with a view to highlighting individual responsibilities, 
minimizing moral hazard, and providing incentives to invest in cost-effective 
risk prevention and mitigation measures. In this respect, private insurance 
often plays an important role in the coverage of property damages and 
economic losses caused by large-scale events,10 but the level of disaster 
insurance penetration, as well as the actual terms and conditions of 
coverage, vary significantly across domestic markets. 
In response to the peculiar insurability problems posed by 
catastrophic risks – such as the geographical and inter-temporal risk 
spreading issues and the high cost of capital to cover low-probability/high 
consequence risks – and in the context of country-specific disaster risks and 
other possible national factors, some OECD governments have entered into 
partnerships with the private insurance sector with the policy objective of 
making disaster insurance available to the general public at affordable rates 
and/or ensuring that private assets exposed to risk are duly covered by 
insurance. To this end, special institutional arrangements aimed at the 
explicit coordination of public and private actions have been set up to deal 
with losses caused by different catastrophic perils, including extreme 
weather phenomena, other natural catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes), 
accidental manmade disasters (e.g., industrial and technological accidents), 
and terrorist attacks. 
Public sector participation in these explicit coordination schemes has 
often entailed one or more of the following: (a) the introduction of a 
mandatory or quasi-mandatory disaster insurance regime – to provide 
sufficient risk pooling and reduce the potential impact of adverse selection – 
and the provision of the necessary supporting legal and regulatory 
framework; (b) the provision of reinsurance arrangements, dedicated lending 
facilities, or other form of State guarantee, to limit private sector exposure in 
case of catastrophic losses and reduce the cost of capital to cover low-
probability/high-consequence events; and (c) the creation of the basic 
preconditions for the private insurance market to work properly (e.g., 
regulations and measures concerning preventive and mitigation measures, 
land use, mandatory building codes, and emergency planning). 
Generally, coping with issues related to natural catastrophes has led to 
the development of different policy approaches and institutional models 
where preventive and mitigation measures are accompanied by the 
implementation of specific public or private insurance coverage systems and 
other instruments. The design and implementation of a sound strategy to 
10. See COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES ASSURANCES [CEA], REDUCING THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL CATASTROPHES (CEA 2007) available at 
http://www.cea.eu/. 
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manage the increasing financial burden of large-scale disaster costs at a 
country or regional level require, in fact, a coordinated and integrated 
approach, entailing several steps and involving all relevant stakeholders. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that a proper technical understanding 
of the underlying risks, including risk differentials across regions, is a 
prerequisite for establishing a sound technical basis for financial 
arrangements and making them sustainable in the long run. Uncertainties 
associated with climate change do not facilitate the accomplishment of this 
task, since historical data on past events and losses are not sufficient to 
properly assess future probabilities. 
In any case, once the relevant hazards, risks, vulnerabilities and 
exposures have been assessed, the expected financial burden of future 
disasters can be alleviated by the adoption of cost-effective risk prevention, 
reduction, mitigation, and response measures.11 Such measures, however, 
cannot completely eliminate the direct and indirect costs of weather-related 
calamities. 
To cover the economic costs of natural disasters, some countries have 
devised a framework of contingency measures either by way of establishing 
special government disaster funds or by promoting catastrophe insurance 
coverage, whereas other countries have decided to deal with the issue of 
emergency assistance and compensation for disaster losses on a purely ex 
post, ad hoc basis, with a minimal or non-existent level of ex ante commitment 
of financial resources. 
The level of ad hoc, ex post government intervention for the 
compensation of losses due to natural disasters varies significantly across 
OECD countries. Some countries rely almost exclusively on an ex post 
approach. In Italy, for instance, ad hoc, ex post compensation of disaster losses 
by the State is the rule, with limited or no involvement of the private 
insurance sector. Other countries use ad hoc, ex post compensation as a 
complement to other funding mechanisms, such as structural catastrophe 
funds or disaster insurance. 
The opportunity to develop an ex ante strategy for the financial 
management of large-scale catastrophes is generally suggested by the 
observation that purely ex post approaches to the compensation of disaster 
losses may have several limitations. In many cases, ex post, ad hoc funding is 
cost-ineffective and untargeted. Delivery of compensation is often too slow 
and, if the hazard risk exposures are significant, the fiscal burden may be 
unsustainable for the public authorities in the long run. Moreover, ex post 
allocation of public funds to meet critical needs may divert resources from 
11. See U.N. secretariat of the Int’l Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UN/ISDR],
Words Into Action: A Guide for Implementing the Hyogo Framework (Apr. 30, 2007); UN/ISDR, 
Indicators of Progress: Guidance on Measuring the Reduction of Disaster Risks and the 
Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (U.N. Jan. 2008). 
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other projects, and critical decisions have to be made under political 
pressure. Furthermore, ad hoc compensation likely entails inequalities in 
treatment and discontent. Finally, even if the matter is not straightforward, 
ad hoc, ex post compensation mechanisms may also entail moral hazard, 
reducing the incentive to take precautions ex ante and increasing the total 
cost of disasters. 
Possible ex ante solutions include the establishment of dedicated 
catastrophe funds, market-based or state-sponsored disaster insurance and 
reinsurance programs, alternative risk transfer (ART) and alternative risk 
financing (ARF) tools – such as risk securitization and contingent capital 
arrangements – allowing broader risk spreading through capital markets. 
The establishment of dedicated catastrophe reserve funds, with special 
appropriations in the public budget or prior legislated spending authorities, 
requires some degree of ex ante financial planning and a commitment of 
public money to cover emergency relief costs and, sometimes, post-disaster 
reconstruction costs. Since rules on the use of such funds in case of a 
disaster are established ex ante, money can be disbursed promptly and a 
relatively consistent treatment of similar situations is ensured across time. 
Such rules may also limit moral hazard by limiting the scope of government 
compensation (e.g., strictly defining eligible damages and placing a cap on 
the level of public assistance). 
In Hungary, for instance, the Fund for Flood and Inland Water 
Compensation (Wesselényi Miklós) regulates the compensation of flood 
damages. Individuals who own real property in risky regions of Hungary pay 
contributions to the Fund and, based on these contributions, are entitled to 
indemnification in the case of loss. The Fund is co-financed by government 
budgetary support if it lacks enough resources to fulfill its obligations. Along 
the same lines, in Austria, the Catastrophes Fund covers parts of the 
damages caused by natural disasters and further help is provided by special 
laws enacted on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, limited ex post compensation is 
available in Poland through various dedicated funds and budget allocations. 
In Mexico, the Natural Disasters’ Fund (FONDEN), created by the federal 
government, provides support, in a complementary manner and within the 
limits of its resources, in case of emergency and natural disaster situations. 
Public catastrophe reserve funds may not be economically or 
politically viable to finance the expected costs of low probability disaster 
events, such as events with a return period of 100 years or more, due to the 
extremely long time horizon. Moreover, if catastrophe funds are aimed at 
covering not only emergency relief costs and public infrastructure losses, 
but also damage to private property owned by businesses and individuals, 
moral hazard may arise, and the incentive to take precautions could become 
very low, particularly if the catastrophe funds are not well-designed or if the 
rules governing these funds are not perceived to be credible. 
In many OECD member countries, there is some degree of 
coordination (sometimes explicit – for example, in the form of institutional 
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arrangements) among stakeholders for the prevention, mitigation, and 
coverage of future potential losses caused by large-scale disasters. In the 
context of such coordination schemes, particularly those institutional in 
character, insurance and reinsurance sector participants, capital markets, 
and public authorities have a defined role to play. These solutions are not 
necessarily public-private partnerships (PPP) arrangements per se (a PPP is a 
voluntary association of both public and private actors seeking to address 
common goals through shared resources and skills), but are nevertheless 
based on some level of mutual understanding of disaster risk exposures and 
broad assumptions regarding the respective roles played by the public and 
private sectors. 
The aim of such coordination is mainly to orchestrate the efforts of the 
various stakeholders involved by setting up a clear framework for action. 
Coordination may take place spontaneously, when economic actors 
recognize that cooperative behavior serves the interests of all parties 
involved. Spontaneous coordination between the private and the public 
sectors generates an implicit partnership. In the United Kingdom, for 
instance, insurance coverage against flood damage has been a standard 
feature of household policies since the early 1960s and the British insurance 
industry was able to make this commitment to its customers on the 
understanding that the UK government would provide effective flood 
defenses. 
With implicit partnerships, the coordination between public and 
private sectors (and other stakeholders for that matter) is subject to a 
degree of uncertainty and may lead to opportunistic behavior. Explicit 
partnerships – in the form of institutional arrangements where risks, duties 
and responsibilities are clearly allocated among the various participants – 
may facilitate more stable and reliable coordination efforts. With explicit 
arrangements, there is a basic understanding among all stakeholders 
regarding the allocation of responsibilities for the taking of precautions, as 
well as responsibilities for the assumption of risks and losses. It should be 
noted that this does not necessarily require the State to take charge of the 
compensation of disaster losses or provide a financial commitment in 
support of private insurance; what is important is that mutualization options 
for protecting against catastrophic losses are clearly understood and 
debated before a major disaster. Individuals, businesses, central and local 
authorities will then be aware of the expected roles played by different 
stakeholders in dealing with large-scale disasters and of their expected 
financial exposures. 
3. The Role of Insurance, Reinsurance and Financial Sectors
In OECD countries, insurance coverage plays an important role in the 
financial management of large-scale natural disasters. In several countries, 
including Belgium, France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, for instance, 
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where inclusion of natural disaster risks in fire and/or other property 
insurance policies is mandated, most natural disaster losses incurred by 
households and businesses are covered ex ante by insurance companies. 
Likewise, flood risks in the United Kingdom are largely covered by the 
private insurance market.12 
Climate change, however, poses serious threats for the insurance and 
reinsurance sectors worldwide. The increased frequency and severity of 
extreme climatic events entail a growing exposure of insurance and 
reinsurance companies across different lines of business including property, 
business interruption, life, health and liability. From an insurance viewpoint, 
the ongoing change in intensity and distribution of extreme weather events 
creates uncertainty and requires constant monitoring and adaptation of 
underwriting standards. 
The threat of a mega-disaster striking a major inhabited area, for 
instance, has dramatically altered the insurance environment. Today many 
insurers and reinsurers indicate that they cannot continue to provide the 
same level of coverage against hurricanes and floods without incurring an 
excessive risk of insolvency or substantial losses of capital or surplus. These 
concerns stem from a balanced reassessment of the insurance industry’s 
financial exposures following recent heavy losses. 
The insurance market depends on the ability to pool homogeneous 
but uncorrelated risks faced by a large number of policyholders. When a 
large number of uncorrelated risks are pooled, insurance companies can 
predict with considerably greater certainty the average occurrence of a 
particular insured event, and thus can efficiently provide financial coverage 
based on the reduction of uncertainty. The ability of pooled risks to reduce 
uncertainty diminishes when the risks of policyholders are correlated, as in 
the case of disaster risks.13 
A related problem with disaster insurance concerns the ability of the 
traditional insurance mechanism to properly manage low probability and 
high consequence (LPHC) events, such as major natural catastrophes. The 
insurance and reinsurance capacity for large-scale risks is ultimately limited 
12. See ALBERTO MONTI, Policy Approaches to the Financial Management of Large-Scale
Disasters, 12 POL’Y ISSUES IN INS., 11-142 (2008). 
13. See, e.g., 8 POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. (2005) (in particular Part I Insurability of
Catastrophic Risks).  See also John R. Coomber, Natural and Large Scale Catastrophes – 
Changing Risk Characteristics and Challenges to the Insurance Industry, 31 THE GENEVA PAPERS
ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 88-95 (2006); Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Markets Under 
Stress: The Case of Extreme Event Insurance, in ECONOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ’ (Richard Arnott et al. eds., MIT Press 2003); Kenneth A. 
Froot, The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination, 60 J. OF FIN. ECON. 529-71 
(2001); M.G. Faure, The Limits to Insurability from a Law and Economics Perspective, THE
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 454-62 (1995). 
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and the financial management of such risks may be quite costly for the 
industry, mainly due to the sheer magnitude of potential insured losses (i.e., 
the size of aggregate claims in case of a disaster) and the inter-temporal 
mismatch between the size of annual premiums and the size of the annual 
expected losses. 
The risks of losses from weather-related catastrophes can be correlated 
both temporally and spatially, and this creates the above mentioned 
geographical and inter-temporal risk spreading problems. The accumulation 
of risk can be quite high in the primary market, since the same catastrophic 
event can cause losses involving many different insured properties and 
infrastructures at the same time, giving rise to potentially immense claims 
burdens in a single policy period. International reinsurance and the possible 
bundling of different perils may address this issue. 
A further problem concerns the lower level of predictability of certain 
catastrophic risks relative to other insurance risks. Until recent years, there 
has been a general lack of reliable data and objective information 
concerning the economic effects of natural disasters. Considerable 
uncertainty is associated with the estimation of the probability of disasters 
of different magnitudes occurring and the size of the resulting losses. 
Technology and computer modelling of natural perils have only recently 
reached the point where such risks can be clarified.  Climate change poses 
new challenges assessing these weather-related risks. 
Finally, on the demand side, it has been demonstrated that the 
bounded rationality of most individuals may lead them to underestimate or 
ignore LPHC risks.  Even a reasonably priced catastrophe insurance 
coverage, therefore, may often be perceived by prospective policyholders as 
too costly.14 
Notwithstanding the above, interesting business opportunities for the 
insurance and reinsurance industry are generated by a growing demand for 
coverage in a riskier environment.15 It is generally recognized, in fact, that 
the insurance and reinsurance industries are a lever of economic 
development and have developed substantial expertise in risk management. 
Therefore, they will play a critical role in addressing global challenges such 
as those posed by climate change and extreme weather events. 
14. See, e.g., C.F. Camerer & H.C. Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565-92 (1989). 
15. Andrew Dlugolecki, Climate Change and the Insurance Sector, 33 THE GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES  71–90 (2008); Arthur Charpentier, Insurability of Climate 
Risks,  33 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. ISSUES 91-109 (2008); EVAN MILLS & EUGENE 
LECOMTE, FROM RISK TO OPPORTUNITY: HOW INSURERS CAN PROACTIVELY AND PROFITABLY 
MANAGE CLIMATE CHANGE (CERES 2006); ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS [ABI], FINANCIAL RISKS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (ABI 2005). 
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In the context of an implicit or explicit coordination scheme involving 
the public and private sectors, the insurance and reinsurance industry can 
contribute significant technical expertise, operational capabilities and 
financial capacity in various phases of the disaster risk management 
process.  Examples of such expertise and capabilities include: risk 
assessment, risk spreading, investment, and management of assets covering 
technical provisions, claims handling, and loss adjustment. 
The availability of accurate disaster risk models, and the ability of the 
insurance industry to process claims arising out of a catastrophic event in an 
expedited manner, often turn out to be crucial elements in the success of 
the coordination schemes. The efficiency of a system providing voluntary or 
compulsory insurance coverage against disasters, in fact, largely depends on 
the professional expertise of insurance companies both in the underwriting 
and in the claims-handling phases. In several OECD countries, the private 
insurance sector has developed the requisite technical expertise for 
providing proper risk assessment and risk allocation mechanisms, rapid loss 
adjustment services, and effective incentives to reduce risk exposure. 
The compensation of disaster losses through risk-based insurance 
policies is self-funded from premiums received. This mechanism makes 
insurance a reliable financial tool for managing and funding risk, because 
the insurance industry specializes in reserving and investing collected funds 
for the purpose of claims payment. With respect to natural catastrophe risk, 
a private insurance-based mechanism is more likely to have funds to cover 
losses over time than an ex post governmental aid disaster program, which 
may have to compete for funding with other programs that are subject to 
changes in the political climate. The solid experience of the private 
insurance sector in assessing risks and adjusting losses, moreover, may offer 
great advantages. Efficient and expedited claims settlement practices may 
lead to socially beneficial results. Risk-based insurance may be able to 
provide additional precautionary incentives for policyholders, through the 
mechanism of private surrogate regulation. 
Governments in OECD countries have sometimes encouraged the use 
of private-sector insurance capacity by adopting regulatory, accounting, and 
fiscal measures concerning, for instance: the introduction of a mandatory or 
quasi-mandatory disaster insurance regime; the fiscal treatment of disaster 
insurance premiums, with a view to providing incentives to purchase 
coverage, and the possibility for insurance companies to establish tax-
deductible reserve funds for catastrophic risk.  The aim of such policies is to 
stimulate both the demand and the supply side in order to facilitate the 
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financial coverage of catastrophic risks by financial institutions and other 
private-sector participants.16 
In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey, for instance, the private insurance 
sector actively cooperates with the public sector in the context of explicit 
coordination schemes. In some OECD countries, the role of the private 
insurance sector in the financial coverage of losses due to natural 
catastrophes and extreme weather events is currently under scrutiny, to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
In several countries, insurance companies, either individually or 
through their industry associations, have also launched various initiatives 
aimed at raising public awareness of natural disaster risks and how to 
prevent or mitigate loss. These measures range from the publication of 
reports, studies, newsletters and brochures, to educational programs in 
schools (Japan), to the development of publicly accessible risk zoning 
models (Austria), to the provision of early warning systems (Germany). In 
Canada, the insurance industry founded, in 1998, the Institute for 
Catastrophic Loss Reduction, an independent, not-for-profit centre for 
multidisciplinary disaster prevention research, and the P&C insurance 
industry association is also actively involved in promoting prevention and 
mitigation. In the United States, private insurers support the Institute for 
Business and Home Safety, which conducts a wide variety of research and 
communications on building-related safety issues, and the Insurance 
Information Institute, which provides safety messages to the public. 
If the insurance industry is called upon to play a central role in the 
financial management of large-scale natural disasters, then it is very 
important to make sure that insurance and reinsurance companies are able 
to perform the assigned tasks effectively. In this respect, the following areas 
deserve special attention: 
• Solvency of insurance undertakings. The setting and enforcement
of appropriate solvency standards are crucial to avoiding a
large number of insolvencies among insurance firms in case
of a disaster event.  Catastrophe insurance requires access
to very large capital resources and a very high level of
capital allocation. If the insurance sector capital base is not
sufficient to support high catastrophe risk retentions,
reinsurance or alternative risk transfer tools (ARTs) become
necessary. Insurance regulators and supervisors, therefore,
16. Information in this and subsequent paragraphs is derived from data
provided by several countries that responded to an OECD questionnaire survey.  See 
Monti, supra note 7.  
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should carefully monitor insurers’ catastrophe reinsurance 
and ART arrangements. 
• Business continuity and crisis management plans. The providers of
insurance services must be able to withstand a disaster
event, not only financially, but also from an operational
viewpoint. As a consequence, insurance supervisors should
check disaster preparedness and crisis management plans
of insurance companies, in order to assess their ability to
promptly and efficiently perform all the necessary services
(e.g., loss adjusting, claims management, claims payment)
in the aftermath of a disaster event.
• Claims management practices. Insurance supervisors should
closely monitor claims management practices to ensure
that disaster insurance claims are processed in a timely,
fair, and efficient manner.
In the context of explicit coordination schemes with the insurance 
industry, some OECD governments have also decided to offer special 
reinsurance arrangements, dedicated lending facilities or other forms of 
backstops or guarantees to limit private sector exposure in case of 
catastrophic losses. 
Where OECD governments have elected to make a financial commitment, 
they have acted, directly or through a special purpose entity, as: 
• Primary insurer: The government acts as an insurer by
providing insurance and responding to claims either to the
fullest or up to a certain limit. Sometimes the private
insurance sector contributes to the scheme by providing
some operational capabilities (such as marketing and
premium collection).
• Reinsurer of last resort: The government protects the insurance
sector by offering special reinsurance arrangements.
Government-sponsored reinsurance programs may be
mandatory or optional for primary carriers.
• Backstop liquidity provider: The government provides liquidity
to the insurers incurring payout burdens or losses due to a
catastrophic event by means of a pre-arranged contingent
loan facility.
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• Guarantor: The government guarantees that any special
purpose entity, pool or fund created to cover catastrophic
risks will meet all its obligations.
Special risk-sharing agreements between the private and public 
sectors, mixing the above features, have also been implemented in some 
countries. 
The government’s decision to play an active role in disaster risk 
transfer schemes by making an ex ante commitment of financial resources is 
often linked with the resolution to introduce a mandatory or quasi-
mandatory catastrophe insurance regime. The mandatory nature of the 
disaster insurance scheme is often cited as a key component of several 
institutional arrangements implemented in OECD countries. However, one 
must clarify the meaning of “mandatory” under a scheme. Some countries 
have made the purchase of catastrophe insurance coverage mandatory. 
Others have simply required insurance companies to make catastrophe 
insurance available, by introducing a mandatory offer of coverage that can 
be declined by the policyholder. In a number of countries, moreover, fire or 
other first party insurance policies are marketed on a voluntary basis, but 
insurance companies are required by law to include coverage for 
catastrophic risks in such policies: This is the case, for instance, in Belgium, 
France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.17  In this respect, it is important to 
note that different levels of compulsion reflect different policy objectives 
and market conditions, and have different advantages and disadvantages. 
The mandatory offer of catastrophe insurance is consistent with the 
goal of ensuring that disaster coverage is available on the market, so that 
businesses and individuals who are willing to purchase financial protection 
can do so. However, low risk awareness or cognitive biases that may affect 
the demand side could lead to sub-optimal take-up rates, since prospective 
policyholders, who are not obliged to purchase catastrophe coverage, would 
not be able to make rational decisions. As a result, there could be several 
individuals who realize too late that they made the “wrong” decision when 
they elected not to purchase coverage. Moreover, if the penetration rate 
remains very low, this may generate insufficient risk pooling. 
The mandatory purchase of catastrophe insurance is consistent with 
the objective of making sure that all those exposed to disaster risks, willing 
or unwilling, are covered by insurance, at least up to a certain extent. While 
this option – assuming that an effective enforcement mechanism is in 
place – ensures widespread diffusion of catastrophic risk coverage, it may be 
unpopular.  It is, in fact, paternalistic, in the sense that it limits private 
autonomy, forcing everyone to purchase coverage.  Such a choice may be 
justified not only by the above mentioned constraints to rational decision 
17. With the exception of the cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Obwalden, where fire
and natural perils coverage is mandatory. 
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making but also by the risk of negative externalities (i.e., situations when 
individual’s actions impose costs on others which are not reflected in the 
private cost function of the agent) and/or opportunistic behaviors. It may be 
argued, for instance, that the individual decision not to purchase financial 
protection against catastrophes ex ante imposes costs on the society as a 
whole (i.e., social costs), in terms of required post-disaster aid and/or 
negative macroeconomic consequences. More generally, this policy choice 
becomes less unpopular if the government is able to explain how, when 
compared to other mechanisms to compensate for disaster losses, a 
mandatory disaster insurance scheme can save taxpayers’ money.  To 
facilitate public acceptance of this option, it could also be explained that 
risk-based disaster insurance – when correctly priced, affordable, and linked 
to actionable measures by policyholders – provides financial incentives to 
encourage investment in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce 
vulnerability and, as a consequence, contributes to the reduction of the 
social costs of disasters. 
The mandatory inclusion of catastrophe coverage in basic property 
insurance policies (e.g., fire, homeowners, motor) marketed on a voluntary basis 
can be effective if the penetration rate of such basic policies is relatively high, so 
that they are used as a “vehicle” to spread catastrophe insurance coverage 
among businesses and individuals. Compared to the mandatory purchase of 
catastrophe insurance, this option entails a lower extent of compulsion and 
may, therefore, be less unpopular. However, it may have negative effects on the 
market for the basic property policy to which the mandatory catastrophe 
extension applies. First, there is a risk that those who do not perceive the 
benefits of disaster insurance, or who are rationally unwilling to purchase it, 
may decide to drop the basic property coverage due to the increased cost of the 
“package.” It should nevertheless be noted that in some countries the 
widespread diffusion of basic property policies is due to a requirement imposed 
by mortgage lenders, so that the decision to drop all insurance coverage would 
be inhibited by such private commitment. Second, tying different insurance 
products together (e.g., fire insurance and flood insurance) may distort 
competition, since policyholders would be forced to choose the same insurance 
company for the coverage of both risks. This, of course, becomes problematic 
only if the price, terms and conditions of the compulsory extension of coverage 
are not mandated by the law. 
Concerning the different types of public sector ex ante financial 
commitments in disaster risk transfer, it should be noted that: 
• The policy choice to provide primary insurance coverage
against disaster risks may be dictated by the fact that the
private insurance sector is unwilling and/or unable to
provide any coverage. Private-sector operational capacity, if
available and cost-convenient, may be used to perform
such functions as marketing, premium collection and
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claims handling. This option, however, may crowd out 
competition from the private sector and in the long run 
discourage adaptation in insurance markets or limit the 
attractiveness of insurance markets for new investment. 
•  The option to provide special reinsurance arrangements is
aimed at limiting private sector exposure to peak risks. This
solution may be justified if the primary insurance carriers are
able to retain a portion of the risk, but there is not enough
reinsurance capacity on the private market to provide the
required stop loss arrangements. The provision of such a
limitation to private-sector exposure may also be part of an
institutional arrangement in which mandatory offer, purchase,
or extension of disaster risk coverage is introduced by law. In
this respect, this option may be aimed at protecting the
insurers’ solvency and, therefore, the effectiveness of the
whole system. Depending on the extent of compulsion,
pricing, terms, and conditions of the reinsurance
arrangements provided by the government, this policy option
may crowd out private-sector reinsurance capacity, limit the
scope for innovation, and inhibit the development of
alternative risk transfer (ART) solutions to cover peak risks.
• The choice to act as a backstop liquidity provider, for example
by offering a pre-arranged contingent loan facility to insurance
companies writing disaster risks, is aimed at helping insurers
to smooth catastrophe losses over time. In other words, in this
scenario private insurance and reinsurance companies retain
the ultimate risk, but they benefit from a more convenient
inter-temporal flow of funds. This allows private sector
participants to gradually adjust the pricing of coverage over
time and alleviates the financial problems associated with the
inter-temporal mismatch between the size of annual
premiums and the size of the annual expected losses.
Depending on the pricing, terms, and conditions of the
backstop liquidity arrangements provided by the government,
this option may crowd out capital market solutions, limit the
scope for innovation, and hinder the development of private-
market alternative risk financing (ARF) tools.
The potential crowding out effects, inherent to each of the different 
options outlined above, may be avoided by periodic assessments of market 
conditions. 
Individual insurance schemes and insurance markets adopt different 
approaches to the pricing of weather-related risks.  While some coordination 
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schemes apply a risk-based pricing mechanism, others have opted for flat 
pricing, invoking the principle of solidarity. In any case, it is important to 
recognize the impact of risk differentials across the territory of a country or 
region and to incorporate such risk differentials in the pricing mechanism, 
with a view to providing proper incentives to those most exposed to risk, 
while keeping coverage affordable and pricing manageable. 
Risk zoning is used for pricing purposes by private insurers in the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States, and 
its use is now also considered in Austria, Belgium, and Poland. In the United 
States, moreover, premiums are heavily based on the prior claims 
experience of the insured, and discounts are available for installing specified 
equipment such as storm shutters, wind-resistant glass and fire suppression 
systems. Risk-based pricing is also adopted by British insurers to cover flood 
risks. 
In France, on the other hand, pursuant to the applicable legislative 
provisions, pricing of insurance against natural catastrophes is based on a 
fixed percentage of the basic premium charged for the underlying property 
insurance policy, without specific risk differentials. As a result of a change in 
the Spanish scheme, the Consorcio’s surcharge for property and business 
interruption coverage (with the exception of property coverage for motor 
vehicles, whose price is set at a fixed amount per vehicle) is now calculated 
as percentage of the sum insured, instead of being a fixed percentage of the 
base premium. 
Flat rates are easy to administer and, if coupled with mandatory 
insurance, may be an effective mechanism to cross-subsidise the cost of 
insurance across the insured pool, which is consistent with the principle of 
solidarity. However, this option entails moral hazard and reduces the 
incentives to adopt cost-effective risk prevention and mitigation measures. 
Deductibles and coinsurance may help cope with moral hazard, but may not 
be sufficient. Risk-based deductibles, nevertheless, may be a possible 
alternative to risk-based premiums, even if the incentive mechanism is 
different insofar as the reward for the adoption of risk-reduction measures 
(i.e., a lower deductible in case of future losses instead of a lower premium 
at renewal) may be perceived as too distant in time and/or uncertain by the 
policyholder. 
Risk-based disaster insurance, if correctly priced and linked to 
actionable measures by policyholders, can not only provide coverage against 
damage – permitting more rapid economic and social recovery – but also 
alerts individuals to the hazards they face and creates financial incentives to 
encourage investment in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce 
vulnerability. It should be noted, nevertheless, that approaches to pricing 
may need to be more pragmatic in disaster insurance schemes than would 
normally be the case if the schemes are to be effective and sustainable in 
the long run. Nevertheless, risk management incentives should be 
encouraged. 
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In recent years, the transfer of the higher layers of disaster risks (peak 
risks) to capital markets has also been considered by public and private 
sector participants in the context of an integrated catastrophe risk 
management strategy.  Capital markets, in fact, may provide an additional 
source of funding and financial capacity to absorb catastrophic risks, 
including risks associated with climate change. The worldwide market for 
catastrophe bonds (cat bonds) and other insurance-linked securities (ILS) is 
relatively young, since it started in the late nineties, but it is constantly 
growing. According to available data,18 2007 was another record year, with 
total new issues in the amount of US$7 billion (US$4.69 billion in 2006; 
US$1.99 billion in 2005;  US$1.14 billion in 2004; US$1.73 billion in 2003).  A 
cat bond is a high-yield bond that contains a provision that may cause the 
principal or interest payments to be delayed or lost to the investors in the 
event of a specified triggering (catastrophic) event (e.g., a hurricane, a 
flood). The cat bond, issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and sold to 
institutional investors, provides the sponsor with fully collateralized multi-
year cover for well-defined risks on an excess of loss basis and serves as an 
alternative or complement to traditional reinsurance. 
The emergence of new trigger types,19 new sponsors20 – including 
sovereign sponsors – and an increased use of shelf offerings that allow more 
18. “With USD7 billion in publicly disclosed issuances for the year, 2007 was by far the most
active year in history of the catastrophe bond market. Record-setting years are becoming 
commonplace, as this is the third year in a row in which a new issuance record was established. Cat 
bond issuance volume for 2007 increased by 49 percent over the 2006 record of US$4.7 billion and 
251 percent over the 2005 record of US$2 billion. The 27 transactions completed exceeded the 20 
closed in 2006 and nearly tripled the 10 placed in 2005.” GUY CARPENTER, THE CATASTROPHE 
BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2007, 5 (MMC Sec. Corp. 2008).  Concerning 2006, Guy 
Carpenter reported that: “(a)cross nearly all measurable dimensions, including the number of 
issuances, total risk capital issued, total risk capital outstanding, number of perils securitized, 
diversity of trigger type and offering structure, activity exceeded all previous annual records, generally 
by a large margin.” GUY CARPENTER, THE CATASTROPHE BOND MARKET AT YEAR-END 2006, 3 
(MMC Sec. Corp. 2007). 
19. The trigger on ILS and weather derivatives determines the conditions under
which payments are made to the sponsor. The most important trigger types are: (a) 
indemnity (the payouts depend on the sponsors actual losses); (b) index (the 
payouts are triggered by the industry loss estimated by an agency that collates such 
information for CAT events); (c) parametric (the payouts are determined by well 
defined parameters of a CAT event); (d) model (the payouts are triggered by a model 
industry loss that is determined by running the actual event parameters through a 
modeling firm’s database of industry exposures); (e) hybrid (the payouts are 
determined by a combination of two or more existing trigger types). 
20. Not only insurance/reinsurance companies, but also other corporate
entities as well as governments now sponsor these transactions. During 2006 two 
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flexibility and lower costs, have been witnessed in recent years.21 A growing 
securitization activity in non-bond form, such as sidecars, Industry Loss 
Warranties (ILWs) and other vehicles was also recorded.22 
Since modern catastrophe risk securitization transactions inevitably 
entail some degree of basis risk (i.e., the risk associated with imperfect 
hedging of the underlying losses), it becomes crucial to determine the 
objectives pursued by the sponsor.  In May 2006, for instance, the Mexican 
government issued a parametric catastrophe bond to cover certain financial 
consequences of catastrophic earthquake risks. The transaction provides 
catastrophe cover, up to US$160 million, to the Mexican government for 
financing emergency costs if an earthquake of magnitude 7.5 or 8 hits 
regions near Mexico City or along the Pacific Coast. The cat bond was sold 
to institutional investors in the United States and in Europe and it was part 
of a larger transaction combining securitization and reinsurance instruments 
to the benefit of FONDEN.23 The catastrophe bond issued on behalf the 
government of Mexico is mainly aimed at providing the necessary liquidity 
for emergency response measures, not at covering the losses caused by a 
severe earthquake. A similar objective is pursued by the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF),24 launched under the auspices 
of the World Bank, which allows Caribbean governments to purchase 
parametric insurance coverage that will provide them with an immediate 
cash payment after the occurrence of a major hazard event, thus enabling 
them to overcome the liquidity crunch that may follow a disaster and start 
recovery operations without delays. 
In a number of emerging countries, innovative capital market 
solutions, including multi-country, multi-peril catastrophe bonds have been 
recently considered to cover the cost of emergency relief measures and 
damages to public infrastructures and lifelines due to a disaster. In most 
OECD countries, however, there has been, to date, little or no use of ARTs to 
cover disaster risks.  
catastrophe bond transactions were sponsored by non-insurance entities, the first by 
FONDEN, a facility created by the government of Mexico (earthquake risk), the 
second by Dominion Resources Inc., a U.S.-based energy company. 
21. A shelf offering is a structure that, after the initial offering, allows sponsors
to issue additional notes of a similar risk profile with abbreviated offering 
documents, on an as-needed basis throughout a transaction risk period. 
22. SWISS RE, SIGMA NO. 7/2006, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS AND INVESTORS 
(Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2006). 
23. See SWISS RE, DISASTER RISK FINANCING: REDUCING THE BURDEN ON PUBLIC 
BUDGETS (Swiss Reinsurance Co. 2008). 
24. See http://www.ccrif.org/
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In Europe, the Reinsurance Directive25 recently enabled member state 
regulators to establish a softer regulatory regime for insurance special 
purpose vehicles (ISPVs). Domestic incorporated and unincorporated ISPVs 
should greatly simplify insurance securitization structures and provide an 
attractive legal framework for insurance risk securitizations. The 
transposition of this Directive in the domestic legislation of E.U. member 
countries is, therefore, expected to facilitate the development of the use of 
insurance-linked securities to transfer catastrophic risk exposures to capital 
markets,26 also in anticipation of Solvency II.27 
4. Conclusion
In a changing risk scenario, insurance, reinsurance and financial sector 
participants can play an important role in the financial management of 
disaster risks associated with global warming, both in developed and 
developing countries. 
25. Council Directive 2005/68/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 323) 1-50 (EU).
26. In Germany, for instance, the existing regulation on solvency margins
(Kapitalausstattungsverordnung) has been amended to allow the commitments by 
regulated ISPVs to count against the reserves of an insurer in the same way as claims 
under a reinsurance would be counted. 
27. Solvency II is the European Commission’s planned reform of prudential
regulation for European insurers. It will be a risk-based, forward-looking regulatory regime 
founded on a market-consistent approach. Companies will be encouraged and given 
incentives to run their business with an increased focus on risk, governance and further 
transparency through disclosure.  The European Commission published its formal draft 
proposal for a Framework Directive on 10th July 2007 and the text is currently being 
discussed in Council and Parliament. Solvency II is based on a three pillar approach which is 
similar to the banking sector (Basle 2) but adapted for insurance.  The first pillar contains 
the quantitative requirements. There are two capital requirements, the Solvency Capital 
Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR), which represent 
different levels of supervisory intervention. The SCR is a risk-based requirement and the key 
solvency control level. Solvency II sets out two methods for the calculation of the SCR: the 
European Standard Formula or firms' own internal models. The SCR will cover all the 
quantifiable risks an insurer or reinsurer faces and takes into account of any risk mitigation 
techniques. The MCR is a lower requirement and its breach triggers the ultimate supervisory 
intervention: the withdrawal of authorisation.  The second pillar contains qualitative 
requirements on undertakings such as risk management as well as supervisory activities. 
The third pillar covers supervisory reporting and disclosure. Firms will need to disclose 
certain information publicly, which will bring in market discipline and help to ensure the 
stability of insurers and reinsurers (disclosure). In addition, firms will be required to report 
greater amount of information to their supervisors (supervisory reporting). 
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In developed countries, there are great advantages to having an 
operational private insurance/reinsurance industry.  First, the insurance and 
reinsurance markets may be able to absorb some catastrophe risk that 
would otherwise fall on the government.  Second, even if there is no 
sufficient financial capacity in the market to provide meaningful protection, 
the administrative resources of the private insurance industry can provide a 
platform for establishing a government-funded and -directed program. In 
this respect, insurance companies can perform key services such as 
marketing of the policies, premium collection, loss adjustment and claim 
payment.28 
In emerging economies, the private insurance market is still very often 
underdeveloped. The cost of insurance in such economies can be an 
impediment to growth of the sector. In consideration of the above, 
alternative risk sharing, risk financing and risk transfer tools, such as micro-
insurance solutions at community level, or parametric coverage purchased 
directly by the government to obtain the necessary liquidity for emergency 
response measures in case of a disaster, may be more appropriate and 
easier to implement. Micro-insurance is the protection of low-income 
people against specific perils in exchange for the payment of premiums 
proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk transferred. Generally 
speaking, micro-insurance is for persons ignored by the mainstream 
commercial and social insurance schemes and it can be delivered through 
community-based schemes, credit unions and other micro finance 
institutions, as well as major multinational insurance providers.29 Index-
based financial risk transfer mechanisms, such as index-based climate 
insurance, provide viable market-based solutions to the risks posed by 
extreme weather risks and can help climate change adaptation, especially 
for the poorer layers of society. 
From a normative perspective, a clear and transparent allocation of 
risks and responsibilities among public authorities, firms and individuals 
emerges as a key component of effective coordination schemes, and a driver 
to the success of any catastrophe risk management program. Another critical 
element is the ability to link policy tools (i.e., the technical features of a 
coordination scheme) with the underlying policy objectives pursued by the 
government, such as providing adequate financial protection to all 
individuals and entities, or simply making coverage available. In any case, 
financial management strategies should primarily focus on promoting 
techniques of prevention, adaptation, and mitigation. 
In those systems that rely on insurance solutions to compensate for 
property losses due to catastrophes, the level of disaster insurance 
28.  See POL’Y ISSUES IN INS. NO.8 (OECD Publishing 2005)
29. See PROTECTING THE POOR 12-13 (Craig Churchill ed., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO] in
association with Munich Re Found. 2006). 
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penetration often remains a key concern. Even if disaster insurance coverage 
is made compulsory by operation of law, the enforcement of the regime may 
prove to be very difficult, especially if there is a lack of insurance culture 
among the population. Promoting disaster risk awareness and educating the 
population to the financial consequences of large-scale disasters becomes, 
therefore, extremely important. 
In general, the challenge is to identify financial solutions that provide 
the right incentives to invest in cost-effective preventive measures with a 
view to reducing vulnerability and the total cost of disasters. The total cost 
of disasters is the sum of the cost of disaster losses (insured and 
uninsured), the cost of preventive measures to avoid or mitigate disaster 
losses, and transaction costs (i.e., the costs of implementing the scheme).30 
On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that public and private 
investments in disaster risk reduction and mitigation measures, by limiting 
exposure and vulnerability to disaster risks, facilitate the development of 
new risk financing, risk sharing and risk transfer tools. In light of the above, 
it becomes clear that disaster risk reduction, mitigation and financing efforts 
are closely linked to one another, and should be carefully coordinated by 
policymakers. 
30. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
(Yale Univ. Press 1970). 
